In Robert Kaplan’s book, Asia’s
Cauldron, I came across this particularly interesting quote: “Submarines
are the new bling, everybody wants them.” At the same time, I was also doing
research on Indonesia’s naval modernization program, which included submarine
acquisition.
Can it be that Indonesia’s submarine
program is based on flimsy prestige politics rather than accurate strategic
assessment?
When President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo
stepped into office in 2014, he had dreams of reinvigorating Indonesia’s
maritime legacy. He then constructed a grand maritime vision, the Global
Maritime Fulcrum. Jokowi envisioned Indonesia as a regional maritime power and
economy in Southeast Asia. The most important driving factor of
Jokowi’s dream would be the Navy. Against the backdrop of increasing regional
tensions particularly in the South China Sea and an increasingly competitive
arms dynamic in Southeast Asia, a major part of Jokowi’s Global Maritime
Fulcrum rests on whether or not the Navy would be capable of becoming a
middle-power navy that can safeguard Indonesia’s maritime interests.
Two years have passed since then. The Navy
is in the process of modernization. Working under the framework of the Minimum
Essential Force (MEF) left behind by former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
and embedded in the Strategic Defense Plan (Renstra). According to MEF
standards, the Navy aims to have around 154 naval vessels by 2024. Ten to 12 of
them include submarines. Indonesia is expecting three Chang Bogo submarines
from Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering and is further planning to
procure three more Kilo-class submarines from Russia.
While the Navy indeed has a long history
of operational experience with submarines, given the limitations of Indonesian
waters and other pressing issues in maritime security, it might be time to take
a step back and start rethinking our submarine dreams.
Times have changed since the 1950s, when
Indonesia was arguably one of the most powerful submarine operators in
Southeast Asia. However, we need to consider the changes in the character of
conflicts and threats that Indonesia faces. In this day and age, does the Navy
really need 10-12 submarines?
Given the rising tensions in the South
China Sea, the appeal of submarines is apparent. Submarines are classic weapons
for sea denial and can act as a force multiplier for surface combatants.
Submarines also serve as a potent deterrent due to their stealth and power. In
conditions of war, submarines can be used to transport troops covertly and
conduct espionage. This is perfectly in line with the Navy’s ambition of
becoming a green-water navy capable of guarding Indonesia’s maritime
sovereignty.
However, beyond these capabilities,
submarines serve little purpose. We need to consider the limitations of the
submarine itself and then position them within the larger picture, such as
geography, the character of security threats and the economy.
First, there are the absolute limitations
of geography. Indonesian waters are narrow and shallow, especially in sea lanes
of communication between islands and straits which function as sea trade routes
and naval chokepoints. Shallow waters would force the submarine to emerge,
hence negating its stealth. Additionally, those particular bodies of water are
often congested with maritime trade vessels. Insisting on operating in
congested waters poses the risk of collisions, which would have diplomatic and
economic ramifications that can have a ripple effect. It is also worth noting
that as other Southeast Asian countries are also acquiring submarines and have
relatively little operational experience, the possibilities of accidents
increases.
Second, there is a question of utility. As
elaborated above, submarines are great when it comes to sinking huge warships
in naval battles. However, the maritime security threats that Indonesia faces
today are not from imperial navies. They come from illegal fishing and piracy.
Submarines are useless when it comes to low-intensity operations. Maritime
Affairs and Fisheries Minister Susi Pudjiastuti’s explosive measures against
illegal fishing boats reflects the gravity of the problem. Indonesian waters
are plentiful with fish, yet due to illegal fishing, Indonesia stands to lose
US$20-25 billion per year. Seeing such grave losses, it would make more
strategic sense to invest in enhancing surface capabilities, such as fast
patrol boats, rather than in submarines.
Indonesian waters still remain a hotbed of
piracy. In 2015, the IMB reported 108 actual and attempted attacks in
Indonesian waters, which is the highest in Southeast Asia. The Navy’s forces
are spread thin and we cannot blame them, for they have to cover a wide expanse
of water. Pirates operate similarly to illegal fishermen; in small, fast boats
capable of maneuvering through the many islets scattered across the archipelago.
Here, we also see a limit to the usefulness of a submarine. From 2004 to today,
the trilateral joint patrols in the Malacca Strait have managed to reduce
piracy to a bare minimum. The success was mostly due to a sustained naval
presence, which deterred pirates. Submarines cannot achieve similar results,
considering they are more comfortable remaining below the waves.
Third, there are financial limitations.
The Indonesian government is currently facing a number of budget cuts that
affect all aspects of spending, including defense. In 2016, defense spending
might be reduced by Rp 2.8 trillion ($214.2 million), which would certainly
affect future acquisition plans.
It is important to remember that the
purchase of a submarine does not stop when it arrives at your doorstep. A
submarine requires constant maintenance, which is technically complex. Without
proper infrastructure and the right technical expertise, it would only be a
matter of time until a new submarine quickly became an expensive hunk of metal.
A major portion of the acquisition budget would need to go into investing in
proper supporting infrastructure, particularly into shipbuilding facilities.
Though the new Chang Bogo submarines have been completed, Indonesia has had to
delay them until December due to infrastructural problems. Additionally, it
takes a high degree of skill to maintain and operate a submarine, meaning that
the government would need to invest in specialized training.
Considering these conditions, perhaps we
need to rethink the urgency of our submarine dreams. Though submarines may be
useful in facing off against a stronger navy, the threat of an all-out naval
battle in Southeast Asia remains small. The funds invested in submarines might
be better off used in enhancing our surface capabilities, since there are far
more pressing security threats in our seas and to the livelihood of
Indonesians.
The writer IGB. Dharma Agastia is a postgraduate student at S.
Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Singapore, majoring in
strategic studies. His research interests are maritime security, civil-military
relations and future warfare.
No comments:
Post a Comment