On 26 July, the Taliban overran the Tirgaran base in Badakhshan which
borders China, Pakistan and Tajikistan
It is an
irony of history to see how utterly frivolous the decade of war has ultimately
turned out to be. Not only are the Taliban — the very ‘savage’ force this war
was fought against — being coaxed into accepting an offer of share in power,
but the very process of peace dialogue is being presented as a sign of success.
Yes, it
is a success! The dirty war is certainly inching towards its end. But the end
does not appear to be better than the war itself because the ‘savage Talib’ is
again on the rise.
However, the ‘savage Talib’ is no longer a ‘terrorist,’ he is an
‘insurgent’ now. Amid cheers of peace, the common Afghan continues to suffer
materially and non-materially as there is hardly anyone to listen to what he
has to say about what he wants for his country. The so-called peace process excludes
him and consequently reduces him into insignificance.
It is not to suggest that the war should not come to an end. But what do
we do when the end itself starts becoming a matter of grave concern — a new
problem in itself to deal with? The so-called ‘peace process’, which Pakistani
officials hailed as ‘ground-breaking’, is a recipe of political domination of
Afghanistan in geo-political sense.
The fact that all stake-holders — Afghan Government, Pakistan, China and
the U.S. — do want to insert the Taliban into Afghanistan’s body politic speaks
volumes about the hollowness of this entire ‘peace process’ and the notion of
development.
“If the Taliban are to return to power, why was the war fought for
fourteen long years?” asked a young Afghan living in the suburbs of Islamabad
as a refugee. For him, things are moving in the wrong direction.
It is quite evident that the Taliban are not simply interested in
getting some ‘share’ in power. Neither do they want nor do they bother about
parliamentary democracy.
Political domination through warfare and fear is the only method they
have historically learnt. This is thanks to the critical support the Islamic
Republic of Pakistan lent to the establishment of the Islamic Emirates of
Afghanistan, which continues to echo strongly in Afghanistan. This support,
unfortunately though, continues till today politically and militarily.
Although Pakistan initially denied any political involvement other than
just being an organizer in the ‘peace process’ initiated in July, its involvement
and role became evident at the recently held summit of Shanghai Co-operation
Organization where it presented itself as the basic initiator of the dialogue.
It turned out to be necessary for Pakistan to ‘expose’ its role to
demonstrate its capacity to bring the opposite parties to the negotiation
table.
Although foreign ministry of Pakistan repeatedly reminded that it acted
exclusively as a mediator in the process, the very fact that the organization
of negotiations between the authorized persons became possible at all testifies
to strong and confidential contacts of Islamabad with the leadership of the
Taliban, and the significance of its influence on their ‘movement.’
Their ‘movement’, in effect, is as strong today as it was a few years
ago. We can assess the Taliban’s strength from a very recent incident. On 26
July, the Taliban took control of a large police base in a remote part of
north-eastern Afghanistan after some 100 police and border guards surrendered
and reportedly joined the militants following three days of fighting.
The loss of the Tirgaran base in Badakhshan province late Saturday
marked the largest mass surrender since the US and NATO forces concluded their
combat mission at the end of last year. Although the Taliban released all
captives later on, the incident shows how powerful a force they continue to be.
Again last Monday, the ‘insurgents’ overran a large district in
Sar-i-Pul Province, in the northwest, when a local police unit surrendered
after a 10-day battle, provincial officials said.
Several of the district’s civil officials, along with the
garrison of 200 soldiers, then retreated to a city in a neighbouring
province. Similarly, a renewed Taliban push has also imperilled Kunduz, the
second most important city in the north, which sits near the border with
Tajikistan.
On Monday, the Taliban seized towns on the outskirts of the city and
took control of scores of villages in a district to its southeast.
It is an irony that the Taliban’s ‘spring offensive’ continues amid
talks of dialogue and peace. It was preceded by an attack on Afghan Parliament
and it is being accompanied by some other different attacks.
It is strange to note that all actors involved in Afghanistan are
showing their readiness to help broker peace in Afghanistan although the
Taliban are not going to cease fire any time soon. As a matter of fact, the
possibility of cease-fire was clearly rejected by the Taliban supreme leader
Mullah Omar.
Following the first round of talks, Mullah Omar’s views were published
by one of Pakistan’s leading English daily, which quoted: “It remains
obligatory upon us to continue our sacred Jihad to liberate our beloved
homeland and restore an Islamic system.”
Although the news of the death of Mullah Omar is in circulation, the
views expressed in his name still reflect what the Taliban think as an
organization.
The statement was released by the Taliban sources and, as such, cannot
be rejected as false because it is a strong reflection of the Taliban’s
strategy of capturing power through military means.
Above cited incidents undoubtedly prove that this strategy is still very
much operational.
It is not clear as to how and when the Taliban would agree to cease fire
to seriously engage in a dialogue. Dialogue and negotiations in the shadow of
‘spring offensive’ are most likely to end in failure.
Continuation of ‘spring offensive’ notwithstanding, the Taliban’s basic
demands, too, remain the same: the departure of foreign forces, constitutional
changes, the release of prisoners, and the removal of the Taliban from the
United Nations sanctions list.
Again, it is still not clear how the Afghan government can possibly
manage to continue dialogue if the Taliban continue to insist on complete
departure of all foreign forces.
With the Taliban still standing as a strong force and with all of their
major demands remaining unchanged, Afghanistan government’s insistence on the
necessity of dialogue seems to be an unreal attempt unlikely to succeed.
One can assess the fragility of the dialogue from the fact that the
Taliban have long refused to acknowledge the very constitution that provides
legitimacy to the Afghan government.
Even if dialogue has to be the way to end the war, it can succeed only
when some of the basic demands of both parties are met. For the Afghan
government, nothing is more basic than cessation of fire. Departure of all
foreign troops from the Afghan soil is the minimum the Taliban would agree to.
Salman Rafi Sheikh is a freelance journalist and research analyst of international
relations and Pakistan affairs. His area of interest is South and West Asian
politics, the foreign policies of major powers, and Pakistani politics.
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